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INTRODUCTION
Safety at live event and music festival venues has become a matter
of increasing concern in recent years. Concerts end abruptly and are
evacuated due to security concerns, such as bomb threats.1 Security
checkpoints including metal detector wands and bag searches create
bottlenecked crowds as attendees express concerns about the number of
security personnel available.2 Concert promoters and venue owners try to
find a balance between keeping concert expenses low while trying to train
security personnel and secure multiple building entrances.3 Artists cancel
meet and greets with fans due to security concerns.4 Large venues install
greater security measures, such as metal detectors, and raise ticket surcharges
while smaller venues weigh the costs of installing security devices versus the
risk of violence when the crowd numbers are in the low hundreds or mainly
consist of young teenagers.5 As concert attendance numbers grow and
concert security issues become evident and more frequent, how can event
venue owners and promoters keep attendees and performers safe in a uniform
manner?
This Note offers state legislatures a proposed model venue security
act that addresses safety issues arising from venue violence. Part I of the Note
addresses the problem of violence within event venues and festivals and
common concerns highlighted by such incidents, such as artist safety, event
attendee safety, and crowd safety during evacuations. Part I also examines
the emergence of tort actions by concert attendees against venue owners and
1. See Indiana Police Say Bomb Threat Halted Rascal Flatts Concert, AP NEWS (Aug.
14, 2018), https://apnews.com/74c80c525d8941c49e5b7d94fd6e4e4f [https://perma.cc/F9HJ4GKQ]; David Lindquist, What Prompted ‘Safety Concern’ and Abrupt End to Rascal Flatts
Show Remains Unclear, INDYSTAR (Aug. 10 2018, 1:13 AM), https://www.indystar.com/
story/entertainment/music/2018/08/10/abrupt-end-rascal-flatts-concert-leaves-indiana-fanspuzzled/954328002/ [https://perma.cc/RQ3H-JZCR]; Variety Staff, The Roots’ SXSW
Concert Canceled Due to ‘Security Concern’, VARIETY (Mar. 17, 2018, 9:15 AM), https://
variety.com/2018/music/news/the-roots-sxsw-concert-cancelled-due-to-security-concern1202729636/ [https://perma.cc/9QJW-MFBE].
2. See Concert Goers Wait in Lengthy Lines Before Beyonce & Jay-Z Show, NEWS
CHANNEL 5 NETWORK (Aug. 23, 2018, 9:42 PM), https://www.newschannel5.com/news/
concert-goers-wait-in-lengthy-lines-before-beyonce-jay-z-show
[https://perma.cc/U89Z3SCG].
3. See Ray Waddell, Security Experts on the ‘New Normal’: Challenges and Logistics
of Concert Safety in the Wake of Orlando Shootings, BILLBOARD (June 14, 2016),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/7407926/security-experts-new-normal-challengesand-logistics-concert-safety [https://perma.cc/D9TG-JHU9].
4. See Jason Chervokas & Vanessa Wilkins, Justin Bieber Cancels Tour Meet-andGreets, ABC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2016, 2:20 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/justinbieber-cancels-tour-meet-greets/story?id=37866933 [https://perma.cc/8PDN-KW22].
5. See Ben Sisario, New Reality After Orlando Attacks: Dogs, Metal Detectors and
Searches at Public Gatherings, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
06/14/us/new-reality-after-orlando-attacks-dogs-metal-detectors-and-searches-at-publicgatherings.html [https://perma.cc/8AYU-DDCL].

442

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:440

promoters in the wake of violent incidents. Part II of the Note examines the
current state of event security legislation, event safety suggested guidelines
from the Event Safety Alliance and the Events Industry Forum, and the ways
in which existing legislation fails to adequately prepare event venue owners
and promoters to provide sufficient security measures. Part III of the Note
explores the manner in which a major venue fire shaped legislation and
regulations in Rhode Island and Massachusetts as to fire safety, providing a
useful illustration of how legislation can address safety issues connected with
acts of violence. Part IV presents model legislation aimed to better regulate
venue security and to address associated liability issues. Finally, Part V
addresses the reasoning behind the model legislation.
I. RECENT VIOLENT INCIDENTS AT EVENT VENUES AND TORT
LIABILITY
Recent violent incidents at venues and the crowd panic after
perceived danger at live events demonstrate how unpreparedness for
potential violence can cause unnecessary loss of life and injuries. Violent
incidents at venues have already raised questions of whether venue owners
and promoters should face tort liability. As more violence against artists and
attendees at live events occurs, such incidents will become even more
reasonably foreseeable and could continue to open up venue owners and
promoters to tort liability.
A. Recent Violent Incidents at Event Venues
Incidents of violence or close calls at events highlight the need for
standard security regulations to preserve artist and fan safety and, in cases
where violence still occurs, to lessen injuries or casualties. For example,
increased interactions between artists and their audiences stir questions
regarding how to protect artists from individuals who wish to cause them
harm rather than ask for an autograph. Meet-and-greets with fans have
become a booming source of revenue for touring artists. They can bring in
revenues often “50 percent to 100 percent higher than the face value of a
ticket,” sometimes more when tied to sponsorship agreements, even for
established artists; meet-and-greets can be particularly helpful for emerging
artists trying to build or expand their fan bases.6 The experiences, such as
photo opportunities or private performances, build upon the social mediafueled perception that artists should be easily accessible to fans.7 However,
as meet and greets with fans become more frequent, more questions arise as
6. Ray Waddell, Meet-and-Greets and Close Fan Interactions, a Financial Necessity
to Many in the Industry, Face a ‘Nation of Rage’, BILLBOARD (June 15, 2016),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7407998/meet-and-greets-nation-of-ragefinancial-necessity [https://perma.cc/H83R-EVFS].
7. Id.
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to how promoters and venue owners can ensure that artists remain safe during
up-close and personal interactions with their fans, particularly in small
venues with small budgets and small staff numbers.8
On Friday, June 10, 2016, musician Christina Grimmie performed at
the Plaza Live theater in Orlando, Florida in front of a crowd of
approximately 300 concert attendees.9 After the concert, as she signed
autographs during a meet-and-greet, a member of the crowd that she did not
know shot her twice, killing her; he then shot and killed himself after Ms.
Grimmie’s brother tackled him.10 Police later discovered that her killer
brought two pistols, two magazines, and a hunting knife into the venue.
Although the venue searched arriving concert attendees with metal detectors
or wands at most other events, only bag searches were in place on the night
of Ms. Grimmie’s murder.11 Also, although signs posted outside of the venue
stated that no weapons were allowed inside, the promoter, AEG, and the
venue, which was owned by the Orlando Philharmonic Orchestra Plaza
Foundation, did not have more intense screening measures in place the night
of Ms. Grimmie’s murder because “the concert was mostly attended by
teenage girls.”12
Ms. Grimmie’s family filed a wrongful death lawsuit against both
AEG and the Orlando Philharmonic Orchestra Plaza Foundation, alleging
that they neglected to have adequate security onsite. Her family sought to
recover medical and funeral expenses, damages, and Ms. Grimmie’s
estimated lifetime earnings.13 Although AEG filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that it did not promote Ms. Grimmie’s entire tour and that the venue
was instead responsible for the security issues, a circuit court judge denied
the motion in April 2018 and noted that “AEG Live contractually shared the
management and control of the concert, including security,” with the venue
owner, and that numerous facts, when taken as true, supported the “existence
of a special relationship between AEG Live and [Ms. Grimmie].”14 The
parties attempted mediation in September 2019. The court never ruled upon
8. See Waddell, supra note 3, at 1; see also Steve Knopper, ‘No One Wants to Die on
Tour.’ Inside the State of Concert Security, ROLLING STONE (June 22, 2016, 3:48 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/no-one-wants-to-die-on-tour-inside-thestate-of-concert-security-226042/ [https://perma.cc/KDF8-479W].
9. Patrick Ryan, In Wake of Orlando Shootings, Venue Safety Comes Into Question,
USA TODAY (June 12, 2016, 6:10 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/music/
2016/06/12/christina-grimmie-orlando-shootings/85788334/ [https://perma.cc/D9H9-5HFB].
10. Michael Williams, Venue, Concert Promoter Ask Judge to Toss Lawsuit in Singer
Christina Grimmie’s Death, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 20, 2018, 5:00 PM), http://www.
orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-christina-grimmie-lawsuit-20180320-story.html
[https://perma.cc/C2ST-XRWZ].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Tina Amendola, Judge Rejects AEG Lawsuit Dismissal in Christina Grimmie’s
Death, POLLSTAR (Apr. 10, 2018, 9:35 AM), https://www.pollstar.com/article/judge-rejectsaeg-lawsuit-dismissal-in-christina-grimmies-death-135024 [https://perma.cc/2JVV-VUFC].
14. Id.
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the Orlando Philharmonic Orchestra Plaza Foundation’s Motion for Final
Summary Judgment because on December 3, 2019, Ms. Grimmie’s family
filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice as to both AEG Live
and the Orlando Philharmonic Orchestra Plaza Foundation.15
The shooting drew comparisons to the murder of guitarist
“Dimebag” Darrell Abbott, who was shot and killed onstage on December 8,
2004, in Columbus, Ohio at the Alrosa Villa Nightclub.16 The venue only had
250 fans in attendance, well below the venue’s capacity of 600.17 The
shooter, who stood outside while the opening bands played and had been told
to leave the venue’s parking lot by a venue employee earlier in the night,
quickly entered the club through an unsecured side door. He then shot and
killed Mr. Abbot, a member of the crowd, a band crew member, and a venue
employee.18 Mr. Abbott’s family filed a lawsuit against the Alrosa Villa
Nightclub and alleged that the security team should have anticipated the
shooter’s dangerous behavior before he got inside the venue. The parties
settled in 2007 on “undisclosed terms.”19 Even before the murder of Ms.
Grimmie and Mr. Abbott, music industry professionals worried that security,
especially in small venues with low budgets, was too lax, allowing for venues
to hire minimal security staff members or overenthusiastic fans to sneak
backstage.20 The deaths of both Ms. Grimmie and Mr. Abbott demonstrate
the importance of venue security even at events with small numbers of
attendees or mainly young fans in attendance.
As concerns grow regarding safety protocol for venues, those
involved in the music festival industry also face concerns regarding violence
and safety.21 The music festival industry is worth approximately three billion
dollars worldwide.22 In 2014, 32 million people attended at least one music

15. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice, Grimmie v. AEG Live SE,
No. 2016-CA-011056-O (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2019).
16. Miriam Coleman, Pantera Calls for Better Artist Protection After Christina
Grimmie Shooting, ROLLING STONE (June 12, 2016, 5:14 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/
music/music-news/pantera-calls-for-better-artist-protection-after-christina-grimmie-shooting
-104558/ [https://perma.cc/C9AL-GBNC]; Peter Wilkinson, Behind the Murder of ‘Dimebag’
Darrell, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 30, 2004, 5:30 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/
music-news/behind-the-murder-of-dimebag-darrell-233541/ [https://perma.cc/4PHC-LPK3].
17. Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 5.
18. Id.
19. Steve Knopper, Are Concert Venues Any Safer After Dimebag Darrell’s Murder?,
ROLLING STONE (Dec. 8, 2014, 3:49 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/musicnews/are-concert-venues-any-safer-after-dimebag-darrells-murder-76676/
[https://perma.cc/UDG5-WV6T].
20. See id.
21. See Luke O’Neil, What Can Music Promoters Do About Concert and Festival Safety
After the Las Vegas Massacre?, ESQUIRE (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.esquire.com/
entertainment/music/a12771114/music-festival-concert-safety-after-las-vegas/ [https://perma
.cc/WX5F-TDQ4].
22. Music Festivals: What’s the World’s Biggest?, BBC (July 4, 2018), https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-44697302 [https://perma.cc/748Q-H9AL].

2020]

VENUE SAFETY AND LIABILITY

445

festival in the United States.23 However, as festival attendance numbers
grow, music festival promoters have become increasingly concerned about
how to keep attendees and artists safe from security risks, particularly in
festival sites within urban areas, surrounded by threats from “well beyond
the traditional security perimeter of the event itself.”24 In the unfortunate
event of a violent incident that is unable to be prevented, unclear evacuation
procedures and inadequately trained security staff can cause more harm to
attendees as they attempt to leave an unsafe area or seek shelter.
On Sunday, October 1, 2017, over 20,000 people attended the third
and final day of the Route 91 Harvest Festival, a country music festival
located “on 15 open acres in the middle of the Las Vegas skyline.”25 The
festival, promoted by Live Nation, was in its fourth year, and the 2017 edition
had not had any major issues on Friday and Saturday.26 During Jason
Aldean’s set, the closing act of the night, a man fired shots from the thirtysecond floor of the adjacent Mandalay Bay Hotel down onto unsuspecting
festival attendees.27 It became the deadliest shooting in modern United States
history, with fifty-nine people killed and 527 people injured.28 Victims, their
family members, and even a few security guards who had worked at the
festival filed multiple lawsuits against Live Nation, the festival promoter,
alleging that the festival lacked both “adequate exits” and “properly trained
employees for when the crowd began trying to evacuate, resulting in
additional injuries and exposure to the gunman’s fire.”29
The aerial assault led to other open-air festivals held in cities to
reassess their security standards, and security professionals began to call for
“expanding the perimeter around so-called soft targets, and for increased

23. Joe Lynch, Check Out These Surprising Stats About U.S. Music Festivals,
BILLBOARD (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/music-festivals/
6539009/music-festival-statistics-graphic [https://perma.cc/MN2J-89PA].
24. See O’Neil, supra note 21, at 6.
25. Avi Selk & Amy B. Wang, Route 91 Harvest Festival: The Las Vegas ‘Sleepover’
That Ended in a Nightmare, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2017/10/02/route-91-harvest-festival-the-las-vegas-sleep
over-that-ended-in-a-nightmare/ [https://perma.cc/8D8E-P7MP].
26. Gil Kaufman, A Brief History of the Route 91 Harvest Festival, BILLBOARD (Oct. 2,
2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/country/7981988/route-91-harvestfestival-history [https://perma.cc/V2X7-9AZN].
27. Daniel Kreps, Las Vegas Shooting: At Least 59 Dead at Route 91 Music Festival,
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 2, 2017, 1:09 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-country/
las-vegas-shooting-at-least-59-dead-at-route-91-music-festival-122293/ [https://perma.cc/YB
6L-9479].
28. Karma Allen, Emily Shapiro & Julia Jacobo, Las Vegas Shooting Death Toll Rises
to 50, No Apparent Connection to International Terror, ABC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2017, 3:19 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/las-vegas-shooting-death-toll-rises-59-apparent/story?id=50223
240 [https://perma.cc/XD8P-4A83].
29. Matt Pearce, Mandalay Bay and Concert Promoter Sued by Hundreds of Las Vegas
Massacre Survivors, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-navegas-lawsuits-20171120-story.html [https://perma.cc/Z3GT-8G5T].
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coordination between venues and neighboring businesses.”30 Event
organizers and security professionals behind the Austin City Limits Festival,
which took place with 75,000 attendees in Zilker Park in Austin, Texas, the
weekend after the Route 91 Harvest Festival shooting, offered refunds to
ticket buyers who were concerned about safety and had police officers visit
condominiums bordering the festival site.31 Chris Robinette, the president of
Prevent Advisors, a security advising company, stated that adjusting security
to deal with potential aerial threats is “a dynamic process that requires
promoters, venue managers, local authorities and other stakeholders to work
together.”32
Nearly a year after the attack on the Route 91 Harvest Festival, panic
erupted on the other side of the country when attendees at the Global Citizen
Festival in New York City, held in Central Park, heard a loud popping noise.
Although police initially thought the source of the noise was a fallen fence
barrier, they later determined that two attendees had gotten into a fight; as
the crowd shifted away from the fight, concert attendees stepped on water
bottles on the ground and at least one burst, which caused the loud popping
noise.33 There were 100 police officers covering the event who had studied
shootings and conducted drills for such situations. The Assistant Chief of the
NYPD implored attendees to “remain calm” after the sound rang out and
police quickly determined that no shots had been fired. Police even brought
Chris Martin, the frontman of the band Coldplay, onstage to implore the
crowd to remain claim and notify them that no shots had been fired.34
However, attendees began running towards exits, knocking over barriers as
they ran while some individuals yelled, “Shooter!” Police officers in the
crowd were reported to have told fleeing attendees to duck.35
Although police calmed the crowd within minutes and no major
injuries occurred, over thirty-seven people suffered minor injuries during the
stampede. Attendees later complained about the lack of signage and surplus
of barricades that made evacuation difficult, as well as the lack of clear
communication about what was actually happening. Festival organizers
eventually apologized for the confusing and dangerous situation and were
left wondering what could have been done differently to better prepare for an
30. Reggie Ugwu & Joe Coscarelli, ‘There Is No Manual for This’: Security Experts
Reckon with Aerial Assault, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/
03/arts/music/vegas-shooting-concert-security.html [https://perma.cc/MH8S-A7ZK].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Sarah Mervosh, Noise at Festival Was Not Gunfire, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/29/nyregion/central-park-panic-global-citizenfestival.html [https://perma.cc/KRE8-85J7]; Ashley Southall & Ali Winston, Noise Wasn’t
Gunfire, but Crowd’s Panic Was Real, and Dangerous, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/03/nyregion/central-park-concert-stampede.html [https://
perma.cc/RX4V-8ZX4].
34. Southall & Winston, supra note 33, at 8.
35. Id.
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evacuation and how to prevent a dangerous mob of fleeing attendees which,
in this situation, was more dangerous to the crowd than the source of the
panic-inducing noise.36 At a time when instances of actual violence at venues
and major events dominate the headlines, how can event organizers ensure
the safety of evacuating attendees when the public is likely to assume the
worst possible scenario in instances of apparent danger?
B. Tort Actions Against Venue Owners and Promoters
Violent incidents often leave courts to deal with the confusion of
which party related to the event should actually be held liable. Many states
have premise liability acts that limit a property owner’s liability to occasions
when a danger could have been reasonably foreseen.37 Generally, under
premises liability law, concert attendees are invitees to whom venue owners
owe a duty of reasonable care.38 However, a venue owner only has a duty to
protect attendees from criminal assault or violence if such an intentional or
criminal act by a third party was “reasonably foreseeable.”39 For example, in
Smit v. SXSW Holdings, Inc, the family of a 2014 SXSW festival attendee
sued the festival organizers and the City of Austin in an action that included
allegations of negligence and premises liability after an intoxicated driver
knowingly sped through a closed city street while attempting to escape from
police, striking and killing the attendee.40 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim
under state law.41 The court determined that the attendee’s family made no
sufficient allegation that the SXSW defendants maintained control of the city
street where the incident took place. Although the city granted the SXSW
defendants a permit to temporarily legally occupy the street, the permit was
insufficient to give SXSW sufficient control to be liable for negligence and
premises liability. In Texas, both of these causes of action require existence
of “control of the premises,” but the duty “does not extend beyond the limit

36. Id.
37. See Jennifer Medina and Jess Bidgood, Uphill Battles in Court in Wake of Killing
Spree, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/us/lawsuits-lasvegas-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/G3MP-FF2P] (“In Colorado, the Premises Liability
Act generally limits landowners from responsibility for dangers on their property that they
could not reasonably have foreseen.”); see also Marrero v. City of New York, 958 N.Y.S.2d
51, 52 (2013) (affirming the dismissal of a concert attendee’s claim against a concert promoter
after an unidentified attendee shoved the plaintiff. The court noted the unidentified party’s
causing the plaintiff to fall constituted “unforeseen conduct.”).
38. 2 THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 10:36 (3d ed. 2018) (citing Rotz
v. City of New York, 532 N.Y.S.2d 245, 248 (1988)); Thomas v. Illinois, 55 Ill. Ct. Cl. 337
(2003)).
39. Florman v. City of New York, 293 A.D.2d 120, 124–25 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); see
generally Selz, supra note 38.
40. Smit v. SXSW Holdings, Inc., 903 F.3d 522, 525–27 (5th Cir. 2018).
41. Id. at 525.
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of the premises owner’s control.”42 The issuance of a temporary legal
occupancy permit alone is insufficient.43 The court then upheld the dismissal
of the negligence and premises liability claim against the city, holding that
the driver’s conduct “was not reasonably foreseen under Texas law,” noting
that the owner of the premises only has a duty to prevent “third-party crime”
if he or she “knows or has reason to know of an unreasonable and foreseeable
risk of harm to the invitee” and that previous incidents involving intoxicated
drivers in the area were not “sufficiently similar to the crime in question as
to place the landowner on notice of the specific danger.”44
In Maheshwari v. City of New York, a 2004 case where several
unidentified men assaulted an International Society for Krishna
Consciousness pamphlet distributor in a parking lot on a music festival site,
the Court of Appeals of New York noted that “[a] random criminal attack of
this nature is not a predictable result of the gathering of a large group of
people.”45 In contrast, in Martens v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois
University, the Court of Claims of Illinois held that a venue owner failed to
use “reasonable care” to protect a concert attendee from the dangerous
actions of a third-party individual after an unidentified person set off a signal
flare that struck and injured the attendee’s face at an outdoor concert.46 The
court first asked whether the situation constituted a “known, dangerous
condition,” whether the venue had reason to believe that the attendee would
fail to protect herself from the danger, and whether the venue owner used
“reasonable care” to protect the attendee from the actions of the third party.47
The court noted that once fireworks began to be set off by unidentified
individuals in the crowd, there were “no public address requests that the
fireworks cease, nor were there any signs or warnings in evidence anywhere
prohibiting or referring in any way to fireworks.”48
The state of Illinois had legislation in place to prohibit the use of
such fireworks and projectiles at the time of the attendee’s injury; the court
noted that such legislation “evidences a clear legislative expression that
lighted, exploding, and flying objects are dangerous to the public.”49 The
court also held that the presence of “between 200 and 250 ushers and regular
security people on duty the night of the incident” gave the attendee “every
reason to believe” that venue staff and security were in place “for her
protection and would take necessary steps to eliminate any dangerous

42. Id. at 527–28 (citing Dixon v. Hous. Raceway Park, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1994)).
43. Smit, 903 F.3d at 528.
44. Id. at 530–32 (citing Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d
749, 757 (Tex. 1998)).
45. Maheshwari v. City of New York, 810 N.E.2d 894, 896–98 (N.Y. 2004).
46. Martens v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 80, 82–85 (1981).
47. Id. at 84.
48. Id. at 81.
49. Id. at 84.
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situation–especially a situation which was prohibited by State law.”50 Finally,
trial testimony established that the launching of fireworks or projectiles had
been a common trend at concerts hosted at the venue in question, so the venue
owner “should have been aware of the dangerous situation.” Therefore, the
venue owner breached a duty to the attendee to protect against the “negligent
or criminal” actions of a third party because the venue owner had knowledge
of previous incidents involving fireworks within the venue and therefore had
knowledge of the danger and a duty to anticipate it.51
A concert promoter can also potentially face tort liability after a
third-party’s act of violence at an event. For example, in Jones v. Live Nation
Entertainment, Inc., the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed a lower court’s
granting of summary judgment in favor of a concert promoter and remanded
for consideration of whether the defendant, concert promoter Live Nation,
owed the plaintiff, a concert attendee, a duty of care.52 The attendee suffered
injuries after falling during a “crowd surge” as other attendees attempted to
rush towards the stage after being encouraged to do so by the performers
onstage, and the attendee alleged that the promoter “acted in a reckless and
careless manner without regard for the safety of their audience when they
knew or should have known that any movement by a majority of their
audience at the same time in the same direction would create a hazard.”53 The
court noted that the trial court abused its discretion by granting summary
judgment because an issue of material fact remained regarding whether Live
Nation had a duty of care towards the injured attendee.54 Although Live
Nation and the venue owner had a rental agreement which split up obligations
regarding security, crowd control, and other details of the concert, the court
noted that the attendee was not a party to that agreement and, therefore, the
agreement could not be used “to determine plaintiff’s rights.” The court also
noted that the plaintiff “was invited by Live Nation to a Live Nationpromoted event, which featured two artists that Live Nation placed in
performance” and therefore had a separate relationship with Live Nation
while on premises leased or licensed to Live Nation.55 In addition to live
event attendees, promoters may also be liable to artists who are harmed
during a violent incident.56
As the number of violent incidents at live events continues to grow,
it is likely to become increasingly difficult for event venue owners to argue

50. Id.
51. Id. at 84–85.
52. Jones v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 63 N.E.3d 959, 975 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
53. Id. at 963.
54. Id. at 970.
55. Id. at 972.
56. See, e.g., Amendola supra note 13, at 4 (describing how a circuit court judge refused
to dismiss a tort action filed by Ms. Grimmie’s family against the concert promoter AEG Live
after a man shot and killed Ms. Grimmie after a concert).
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the unforeseeable nature of such incidents.57 Implementation of standardized
venue security measures gives venue owners and promoters a clear sense of
what steps they must take to properly secure an event and, in the unfortunate
case of a security incident, would protect venue owners and promoters from
liability if they followed the security measures. For example, in Villa v.
Paradise Theater Productions, Inc., a concert attendee sought damages from
a concert promoter and venue owner after another individual assaulted the
attendee at a concert.58 After the promoter and venue owner presented
evidence that they had security measures in place the night of the concert,
including “the provision of security guards, metal detectors, handheld metal
detecting wands, a police presence, and mandatory coat check,” the Supreme
Court of the State of New York held that the defendants established prima
facie that they had “reasonable” security measures in place and granted the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to
raise an issue of fact or establish that any “breach in the duty to provide
security proximately caused plaintiff’s injury.”59
II. EXAMPLES OF EXISTING VENUE SECURITY LEGISLATION AND
MODEL CODES
Although many states already have legislation in place regarding
crowd control, outdoor music festivals, and security staff requirements,
venue security legislation often only applies to large venues or leaves
decisions about sufficient standards to only a small number of officials. Such
legislation is not expansive enough to actually keep performers or attendees
safe. However, two model venue safety codes, The Event Safety Guide and
The Purple Guide to Health, Safety and Welfare at Music and Other Events
(the “Purple Guide”), give venue owners and promoters a helpful framework
to use as a starting point when determining how to keep venues secure.
A. Existing Venue Security Legislation
Several states have legislation in place regarding crowd control in
public spaces. Critical aspects of such legislation include crowd control
plans, specified numbers of security personnel required to be onsite during
events, security guard training requirements, and safety requirements specific
to outdoor music festivals. Per New York statute, the operators of “places of
public assembly,” which are deemed to be locations which can hold at least
5,000 people, must “establish a plan to be used for the purposes of crowd

57. See Brian D. Caplan, Concert Venue and Promoter Liability for Violent Acts and
Injuries at Concerts, 29 NYSBA ENT. ARTS & SPORTS L.J. 63, 65 (2018).
58. Villa v. Paradise Theater Prods., Inc., 85 A.D.3d 402, 402–03 (N.Y. App. Div.
2011).
59. Id.
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control in the event of a riot.”60 Crowd control plans must be filed with the
state emergency management office and local police and fire departments
thirty days before the operator hosts an event.61 An “operator” is “the primary
tenant of a place of public assembly or the person or persons responsible for
the operation and management of said place of public assembly. If no
operator of said place of public assembly can be ascertained, then the owner
shall be deemed the operator.”62 Ohio’s legislature enacted a statue that
forbids the sale of non-numbered tickets that do not correspond to specific
seats for “live entertainment” performances and concerts held in venues with
more than 3,000 tickets offered to the public, unless the hosting venues meet
two criteria: the venues must have at least eight entrances or turnstiles, and
the entrances must be “opened, maintained, and properly staffed at least one
hour prior to the scheduled start of the performance.”63 However, the
legislation does not provide any ascertainable standards to regulate security
at those entrances, such as bag checks or pat-downs.
Venue security guards are often in the best position to prevent a
violent incident or lessen the impact of such an incident by maintaining
security checks at venue entrances, isolating threats, or instigating an orderly
evacuation of attendees. However, there are no federal regulations regarding
the training of security guards, and the majority of states do not require
individuals to undertake even 40 hours of security training to work in a
security guard position.64 Although legislators introduced approximately 90
bills regarding security officer training in 2015, none of those bills advanced
through the legislative process.65
Many states have enacted statutes that provide some regulation of
security at live events, but the statutes are often not as expansive or helpful
as possible because they do not contain clear factors to consider when
responsible parties decide how many security personnel an event requires.
For example, event venues in North Dakota are required by statute to allow
a sheriff or chief of the peace officer to decide how many, if any, “deputy
sheriffs, special officers, or licensed private security officers” should be
onsite during a live event, at the expense of the concert promoter.66 However,
while the North Dakota statute does not limit what constitutes a “music
festival” by any set number of attendees, only “a musical performance by one
or more groups held out of doors with the audience being present primarily
for the purpose of listening to music,” the statute does limit what constitutes
60. N.Y. LAB LAW §§ 475(1)–(2) (McKinney 2018).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2917.40(B)–(D) (West 2019).
64. Jenni Bergal, In Many States, Security Guards Get Scant Training, Oversight, PEW
(Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/
11/10/in-many-states-security-guards-get-scant-training-oversight [https://perma.cc/4VFG5KC7].
65. Id.
66. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 53-02-08 (West 2019).
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a “public concert” to a “musical performance . . . held indoors . . . with the
audience being present primarily for the purpose of listening to music and
the location of such musical performance having a seating capacity of at least
one thousand people.”67
Many states have enacted legislation to regulate outdoor music
festivals through the issuance of permits. However, these statutes often fail
to specify security requirements needed for obtainment of a permit and often
leave the decision of whether a promoter meets such requirements to the
independent discretion of a designated local official. Many of the statutes do
not even mention security requirements to prevent potential violent incidents.
For example, Washington’s legislature enacted statutes specifically to
regulate outdoor music festivals, but the legislative declaration specifies that
the legislation is mainly designed to assist with “the enforcement of the
existing laws and regulations on dangerous and narcotic drugs, indecent
exposure, intoxicating liquor, and sanitation [that] has been rendered most
difficult by the flagrant violations thereof by a large number of festival
patrons,” rather than the prevention of violent incidents at outdoor music
festivals.68 In Delaware, the Superintendent of the State may only issue a
permit to host an outdoor music festival contingent upon the promoter’s
showing of evidence that he or she has provided “adequate security for the
safety of the spectators and their property.”69 However, the Delaware statute,
like several other state statutes, specifies no guidelines to determine what
measures actually constitute “adequate security.”70
B. Existing Model Venue Safety Code Sources
There are not many organizations dedicated to model venue safety
codes. However, in the wake of rising venue safety and violence concerns,
organizations dedicated to standardizing venue safety standards have begun
to emerge. The Event Safety Alliance (ESA) is a non-profit association made
up of members of the live event industry. It was incorporated in February
2012 as a response to growing event safety concerns of event industry
workers and modeled after event safety guidelines in the United Kingdom.71
The organization’s goal is to promote “‘life safety first’ throughout all phases
of event production and execution” and to help event professionals and
attendees be “[e]mpowered, [s]afe, and [a]ware of the reasonably foreseeable

67. §§ 53-02-01(1)–(3).
68. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.108.010 (West 2018).
69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 28, § 926(c)(1) (West 2018).
70. Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 17-1404 (West 2018).
71. Kevin M. Mitchell, Event Safety Alliance Moves into Next Phase, PROJECTION,
LIGHTS & STAGING NEWS, Sept. 2014, at 48; Ind. State Fair Stage Collapse Lessons Included
in Worldwide Event Guidelines, WNDU (Dec. 1, 2013, 3:23 PM), https://www.wndu.com/
home/headlines/Safety-guide-for-worldwide-outdoor-events-lauded-233995601.html [https:
//perma.cc/972X-W4V8].
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risks around them.”72 The ESA provides online entry-level event safety
training programs and a “competency credential” program to provide safety
certification for event workers.73 Such certification is not yet required in the
United States.74 The ESA also provides live event and crowd safety
symposiums to teach event professionals how to “understand the main risks
of managing crowds,” “describe the phases of crowds and their psychology,”
“conduct calculations for flow rates and density for people in crowded
places,” “identify crowd behaviors in emergency situations and how to
manage them,” and “manage safe pedestrian flows in crowded places during
all phases of an event including emergencies.”75
The ESA published its first Event Safety Guide in 2014 with the
intention for it to be a “living document” to be “revise[d] and improve[d] as
new approaches and technologies emerge.”76 The Event Safety Guide
contains event-specific considerations on various sizes of events, including
small events, arena events, trade shows, and all night events, as well as
suggested guidelines for emergency planning, communication, and venue
and site design.77 The Event Safety Guide recommends the creation of an
event safety management plan during the early production phase of an event,
which should include a plan for on-site first-aid and “arrangements with local
hospitals,” a transportation management plan regarding vehicular routes
inside the venue and public transportation arrangements and traffic
management, and basic details of the event including venue layout details.78
The Event Safety Guide also suggests the hiring of a safety
coordinator for all events, with the exception of some small events where the
event organizer “is competent to devise and apply protective measures
themselves.”79 However, it notes that it is equally important for small-event
organizers “to carry out a risk assessment for the event, to identify which
hazards are of greatest significance” and that the important factor to consider
is not the size of an event, but “the proportionate level and extent of facilities
and safe management systems required to ensure the health, safety, and
welfare of patrons, performers, and event staff.”80 The Guide recommends
that for all types of events that require a safety coordinator, he or she should
report directly to the event organizer to “eliminate the ‘filtering’ of
72. Who We Are, EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/ourmission/
[https://perma.cc/QU9S-3S7N].
73. See Event Safety Access Training, EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafety
alliance.org/event-safety-access-training-esat/ [https://perma.cc/A4PU-972V].
74. See id.
75. See ESA’s Crowd Safety Symposium Comes to Rock Lititz This November, EVENT
SAFETY ALLIANCE, https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/crowd-safety-symposium-work
shops/ [https://perma.cc/4H38-RW24].
76. EVENT SAFETY ALL., THE EVENT SAFETY GUIDE 3 (Donald C. Cooper ed., 2014).
77. Id. at 3–8.
78. Id. at 15–16.
79. Id. at 21.
80. Id. at 302.
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information by third parties . . . and that the coordinator assist with tasks
including the:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Preparation and monitoring of site safety rules;
Liaison with contractors, event staff and the health and safety
enforcement authority on site;
Checking of safety method statements and risk assessments;
Communication of safety information to contractors on site;
Monitoring and coordinating safety performance; and
Coordinating safety in response to a major incident.81

The Guide also states that no one should assign the safety coordinator
“other competing roles which would divert his or her attention during the
event.”82
The Event Safety Guide provides guidelines for “major incident
(emergency) planning.”83 The Guide defines a “minor incident” as an
undesired event, such as a low-level crime or minor injury that does not
necessarily involve local authorities and is not “likely to escalate.”84 A
“major incident” is defined as an incident that is “likely to require the
implementation of special or non-routine arrangements and resources from
one or more emergency services” and, if it occurred, would involve local
authorities in the treatment of a large amount of deaths and rescues,
responding to a large influx of public and news inquiries, and the need for
“combined resources” of at least two emergency services.85 The Guide
recommends that event organizers put together a flexible “major incident
plan” that names key parties and identifies a pre-decided meeting spot for
key decision makers in case of a major incident, evacuation paths and
possible holding areas for attendees, ambulance loading areas, potential PA
announcement scripts for emergency messages, and mechanisms and
procedures to alert and warn attendees and the public of the incident.86
The “major incident” section of the Event Safety Guide also
discusses the importance of having a plan in place to understand and deal
with issues that might impede evacuation paths, such as geographical
features surrounding an outdoor event that might slow attendee movement,
traffic backups, or transportation issues that strand attendees at the event
site.87 The Guide stresses the importance of having a major incident plan
approved “at the highest level possible rather than at only the operational
level since high level decision makers will usually have the most
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29–30.
Id.
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responsibility in an emergency major incident situation.88 However, it also
notes the importance of communication of plans with guest services and
security workers who work in shifts and are brought in to help quickly.89 The
Guide suggests having “individual, team or group presentations, written
instructions and training videos” prepared to efficiently and effectively
inform these workers of the plan.90
The Event Safety Guide also discusses the importance of effective
communication with attendees and the media in case of a major incident.
Since patrons are likely to document incidents immediately through social
media, and the media will therefore likely inquire about a major incident
quickly after it occurs, the Guide suggests designating a chief press officer to
communicate with the media and clearly plan a “media rendezvous point.”91
The Guide stresses the importance of both internal communication and
communication to the public. Internal communication recommendations
include a system to ensure that vendors, event staff, and guest members
receive clear notification if the venue or event site requires evacuation.92
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is an independent regulator
in Great Britain that seeks to “prevent work-related death, injury and ill
health.”93 It initially published the Purple Guide, a non-compulsory guide for
event organizers “to manage health and safety, particularly at large-scale
music and similar events.”94 The Events Industry Forum, an “informal
organization” comprised of members who are “involved in representing the
UK event industry or influencing the industry through training/education,”
took over online publication of the Purple Guide in 2013 but still consults
the HSE for “workplace health and safety” sections of the Purple Guide.95
The Events Industry Forum hosts bi-annual meetings for event industry
professionals to discuss topics affecting the industry such as policing and
licensing.96
Like the Event Safety Guide, the Purple Guide recommends having
an event safety plan in place and notes that one must consider the “scale, type
and scope of the event” to determine “what might go wrong and what

88. Id. at 31.
89. Id. at 31.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 81.
92. Id. at 76–83.
93. The HSE Story, HEALTH AND SAFETY EXEC., http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/hsestory.htm [https://perma.cc/3W2M-T27J].
94. THE PURPLE GUIDE TO HEALTH, SAFETY AND WELFARE AT MUSIC AND OTHER EVENTS
[hereinafter “PURPLE GUIDE”], https://www.thepurpleguide.co.uk [https://perma.cc/B5Z2-B2
R7].
95. Id.; EVENTS INDUSTRY F., http://www.eventsindustryforum.co.uk [https://perma.cc/
H78Z-UGKP].
96. About the EIF, EVENTS INDUS. F., https://www.eventsindustryforum.co.uk/
index.php/about-us [https://perma.cc/W5AR-S2DP].
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preventative measures are required.”97 The Purple Guide states that five steps
are necessary for risk assessment: identification of the hazards, deciding who
might be harmed and how, evaluation of the risks and precautions, recording
and implementation of such findings, and a review of the assessment with
updates as necessary.98 Event professionals are “only expected to tackle
reasonably foreseeable hazards, taking account of reasonably foreseeable
events and behavior.”99 Any settled methods for preventing risks should be
“periodically checked and tested.”100 The Purple Guide also suggests a “clear
understanding” of which individual is responsible for “safety matters” and
how “specific safety duties will be allocated” for each event.101 It notes that
signage should be large enough to view from a distance, attached to a fixture
point, and should be “pictorial in content” whenever possible to assist event
attendees that do not speak English.102 The Purple Guide notes that the
“timely use of social media and the involvement of appropriate social media
professionals should be included in public information provision whenever
possible” to “ensure that messages are coordinated by the event rather than
members of the public.”103
III. FIRE SAFETY LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS: A RESPONSE TO
TRAGEDY
One can draw parallels between venue security issues and fire safety
issues in venues, which have gradually inspired changes in how venues are
managed and monitored for fire safety across the United States. One deadly
incident, the Station nightclub fire, instigated legislative action in Rhode
Island, the state in which the fire occurred, and Massachusetts, a state with a
large number of citizens affected by the incident, to prevent recurring fire
tragedies. 104 The state legislatures’ responses to fire tragedies serve as a
model for how all states can proactively respond to the danger of violent
incidents at event venues and prevent unnecessary casualties and potential
97. Planning, Management & Risk Assessments, PURPLE GUIDE, https://www.thepurple
guide.co.uk/index.php/the-purple-guide/104-2-planning-management-risk-assessments
[https://perma.cc/XRM8-F6KT] (on file with author; available through subscription).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Venue & Site Design, PURPLE GUIDE, https://www.thepurpleguide.co.uk/index.php/
the-purple-guide/103-3-venue-site-design?showall=&start=1 [https://perma.cc/Q4P4-D6A5]
(on file with author; available through subscription).
103. Id.; Communication, PURPLE GUIDE https://www.thepurpleguide.co.uk/index.php/
the-purple-guide/100-6-communication?showall=&start=0 [https://perma.cc/SA6R-HYUS]
(on file with author; available through subscription).
104. See Robert F. Duval, NFPA Case Study: Nightclub Fires, NAT’L FIRE PROTECTION
ASS’N 1, 29–34 (2006), https://www.nfpa.org/~/media/files/news-and-research/resources/
fire-investigations/case_study_nightclub_fires.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc/72TX-LVAN]
(outlining Rhode Island’s legislative response to the Station nightclub fire).
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litigation as venue owners, concert promoters, and the general public become
more aware of the predictability of such incidents.105
A. The Station Nightclub Fire
On February 20, 2003, over 450 fans packed the Station, a nightclub
with a capacity of 300, to attend a concert by the rock band Great White.106
During the show, the band’s tour manager lit pyrotechnics behind the band
as a part of the stage act. Sparks from the pyrotechnics caught fire, which
spread due to polyurethane foam lining the ceiling and walls of the
nightclub.107 Fire consumed the building within three minutes, killing 100
concert attendees and injuring over 200 more.108 Jeffrey and Michael
Derderian, the owners of the Station nightclub, maintained that they believed
the polyurethane foam that lined the ceiling and walls for sound insulation
was flame-resistant though it increased the flames.109 The polyurethane foam
violated Rhode Island’s fire code at the time of the incident, but the club had
never received a citation for the foam even though there had been several fire
code inspections before the fire. In addition, the West Warwick fire inspector
had recently doubled the club’s legal capacity before the fire.110
The Station had three public exits, including two double doors that
served as the main exits and two separate, three-foot wide doors that opened
onto stairways outside of the building. However, the two double doors that
served as the main exit were only accessible through one three-foot door.111
Individuals typically take the same path to exit a building as they use to enter
the building.112 As two-thirds of concert attendees flooded towards the main
exit of the Station, people began to fall, and the main exit became blocked by
fallen patrons. Several individuals were crushed during the evacuation.113

105. See Caplan, supra note 57, at 65 (noting that “it will become more difficult for
venues and promoters to disclaim liability by maintaining that such senseless acts of violence
are not foreseeable”).
106. See Max Winograd, Station Nightclub Owners Sentenced for Their Role in Fatal
2003 Fire, BROWN DAILY HERALD (Dec. 8, 2006), http://www.browndailyherald.com/
2006/12/08/station-nightclub-owners-sentenced-for-their-role-in-fatal-2003-fire/ [https://per
ma.cc/Y65D-6HDV].
107. Id.
108. Tracy Breton, Station Owners Silent as Fire’s 10th Anniversary Nears, PROVIDENCE
J. (Feb. 12, 2013, 10:22 AM), http://www.providencejournal.com/topics/special-reports/
station-fire/content/20130212-station-owners-silent-as-anniversary-nears.ece
[https://perma.cc/3TT8-XC43].
109. Id.
110. See also Winograd, supra note 106.
111. Jim Tidwell, The Station Nightclub Fire: Revisiting the Lessons, FIRE ENGINEERING
(Jan. 1, 2012), https://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-165/issue-1/features/
station-nightclub-fire-revisiting-lessons-full.html [https://perma.cc/USE3-GQZ4].
112. JOHN BARYLICK, KILLER SHOW, THE STATION NIGHTCLUB FIRE: AMERICA’S
DEADLIEST ROCK CONCERT 103 (2012).
113. Tidwell, supra note 111.
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Although Rhode Island’s building code required sprinklers in all
“places of public assembly occupied by more than three hundred people” in
2003, there was no sprinkler system installed in the Station nightclub due to
a grandfather clause in the legislation, which allowed for the exemption of
buildings constructed before the legislation became effective. In addition, the
Station’s employees had received no training on how to respond in the event
of an emergency in the building.114 Witnesses even reported that venue
security personnel turned away concert-goers who attempted to leave the
building through the band door exit during the first minute of the fire because
the exit was “for the band only.”115
B. Model Code and Legislative Responses to the Station Nightclub
Fire
In the aftermath of the Station nightclub tragedy, avoidable issues
within the existing Rhode Island fire code became apparent. The fire
motivated both nonprofit fire safety organizations and state legislatures to
update model fire codes and legislation to prevent future venue fires. The
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is a nonprofit organization
dedicated to “eliminating death, injury, property and economic loss due to
fire, electrical and related hazards.”116 The organization creates codes and
standards to lower risks of fire by “establishing criteria for building,
processing, design, service, and installation around the world.”117 The
International Code Council (ICC) is a nonprofit organization dedicated to
developing “model codes and standards used worldwide to construct safe,
sustainable, affordable, and resilient structures.”118 States have adopted
provisions from the model codes of both organizations into their own fire
legislation.
Both organizations used the Station nightclub fire as a catalyst to
update their model fire codes. For example, before the Station nightclub fire,
both organizations required automatic sprinkler systems to be in place for
buildings with capacities over 300. However, neither code required buildings
that existed before the provision to install the sprinklers. The Station
nightclub fire demonstrated that such “grandfathering” provisions could have
deadly consequences. The NFPA updated its code to require automatic
sprinkler systems in all new nightclubs, bars with live entertainment, and
places of assembly. Buildings that existed before the update were required to

114. BARYLICK, supra note 112, at 67.
115. Id. at 240.
116. NFPA Overview, NAT’L FIRE PROTECTION ASS’N, https://www.nfpa.org/AboutNFPA/NFPA-overview [https://perma.cc/25SJ-7QH3].
117. Id.
118. About the International Code Council, INT’L CODE COUNCIL, https://www.
iccsafe.org/about-icc/overview/about-international-code-council/ [https://perma.cc/CN5U9Y46].
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install automatic sprinkler systems if the building capacity was above 100.119
The ICC also updated its code to require automatic sprinkler systems in all
venues with capacities of one hundred or with assembly areas of 5,000 square
feet or larger.120
In Rhode Island, the state in which the fire took place, the legislature
passed the Comprehensive Fire Safety Act, which was based upon findings
from the “Special Legislative Commission to Study All Aspects of Law &
Regulation Concerning Pyrotechnic Displays and Fire Safety,” a seventeenperson commission comprised of “legislators, fire service leaders (both labor
and management), and public-sector representatives,” including “members
of the state legislature, representatives of the state fire service, the State Fire
Marshal, the Lt. Governor, the Adjutant General of the State, the Director of
the Department of Public Health, the Executive Director of the State Fire
Code Board of Appeal and Review, and representatives from the hospitality
and real estate industries.”121
The commission made multiple recommendations, such as
mandatory sprinklers in clubs with capacities of 150 or greater; prohibition
of fireworks in nightclubs and similar places along with strict regulation of
fireworks in larger venues; requiring municipally connected fire alarms in
“concentrated use places of assembly that are defined as ‘special amusement
buildings’ . . . with occupancies of 150 or greater . . . by July 1, 2004”; giving
power of entry for purposes of inspections to fire marshals “similar to those
of other state and local inspectors”; making it a felony to violate requirements
for “commercial and public use or display of commercial pyrotechnics”; and
the allocation of “greater enforcement powers to fire marshals.”122 The
Commission heard testimony from victims and families of deceased victims,
fire and life safety experts, and other entertainment and hospitality industry
members.123 The Commission recommended requiring the Fire Marshal to
“make public the repeat and/or uncorrected fire safety code violations of all
places of assembly that are special amusement buildings and to provide this
information on a website” and to authorize a penalty of up to $5,000 for using
“decorative or acoustical materials” that were not certified “consistent with
NFPA requirements or such other requirements as may be established by the
Fire Safety Code Board of Appeal and Review.”124
The Comprehensive Fire Safety Act also provided for “the adoption
and implementation of an up-to-date comprehensive system of codes for fire

119. Duval, supra note 104, at 1.
120. Tidwell, supra note 111.
121. 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 23-28.01-1 to -6 (West 2018); Duval, supra note 104,
at 29.
122. Steve Blackistone, R.I. Adopts Fire Safety Law in Response to Nightclub Fire,
FIREHOUSE (Jan. 31, 2004), https://www.firehouse.com/leadership/article/10528908/riadopts-fire-safety-law-in-response-to-nightclub-fire [https://perma.cc/6WUB-7HZ2].
123. Duval, supra note 104, at 29.
124. Id. at 30.
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safety.”125 It called for the fire marshal, along with a fire safety code board
of appeal and review, the building code commission, and several other
departments, to “prepare and approve” a “comprehensive plan setting forth
goals and implementation measures for improving fire safety” that would be
updated every five years.126 The legislation also called for the adoption of the
National Fire Protection Association Uniform Fire Code and Life Safety
Code in the State of Rhode Island and repealed “grandfather exemptions” for
buildings which existed before the Act, the same exemptions which had
allowed the Station nightclub to operate without the installation of a sprinkler
system.127 However, the legislation did allow for “reasonable notice” of fire
safety code violations and allowed for the establishment of a “timetable for
compliance.”128
The state of Massachusetts also had ties to the Station nightclub fire;
one-third of the victims of the fire were citizens of the state.129 The state
created a Task Force on Fire and Building Safety in April 2003, less than two
months after the Station nightclub fire, which included the Secretary of
Public Safety; the state Fire Marshal; state commissioners; fire chiefs from
around the state; fire protection engineers and building officials; family
members of fire victims; and insurance, hospitality, and entertainment
industry representatives.130 In 2004, the governor of Massachusetts signed a
bill requiring sprinklers in every “building or structure . . . of public
assembly, with a capacity of 100 persons or more, that is designed or used
for occupancy as a nightclub, dance hall, discotheque, bar, or for similar
entertainment purposes” into law.131 Approximately nine years after the
signing of the bill, the State Fire Marshal estimated that over 800 venues in
Massachusetts had been retrofitted for sprinklers as required by the bill.132
The state legislature vested the power to enact fire regulations in a
Board of Fire Prevention. In addition, the Board was required to hold “public
hearings on the first Thursday in May and October in each year, and at such
other times as it may determine, on petitions for changes in the rules and
regulations formulated by it.”133 If the Board believed it appropriate to make
changes to the fire regulations after the hearings, it was to “appoint a day for
a further hearing . . . [and] give notice thereof and of the changes proposed
125. § 23-28.01-3.
126. § 23-28.01-5; BARYLICK, supra note 112, at 67.
127. § 23-28.01-5.
128. § 23-28.1-7.
129. Duval, supra note 104, at 31.
130. Id.
131. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 148 § 26G1/2 (West 2004); see also Deadliest U.S.
Nightclub Fire Influences Safety Codes, Burn Care, CBS NEWS (Nov. 28, 2017, 10:43 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cocoanut-grove-boston-nightclub-fire-safety-codes-burncare/ [https://perma.cc/7W3S-ZVMY].
132. Patrick Johnson, 10 Years After the Station Nightclub Fire in R.I., Massachusetts
Touts Safety Measures, MASSLIVE (Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.masslive.com/news/
index.ssf/2013/02/10_years_after_rhode_islands_s.html [https://perma.cc/V75K-RX5N].
133. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 148 § 10 (West 2018).
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by advertising in such newspapers . . . or professional publications . . . at least
ten days before said hearing.”134 The Board of Fire Prevention enacted
amendments to the Massachusetts Comprehensive Fire Safety Code,
including the requirements that venues that fail a yearly fire safety inspection
are not allowed to renew their liquor licenses135 and that “[a]ll nightclubs,
dance halls, discotheques and bars with occupancies above 100 people must
have certified crowd managers . . . . Every facility must have one crowd
manager for every 250 occupants when the facility is open.”136 A crowd
manager is to be certified every three years by completing an online course;
his or her duties include responsibilities to:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Maintain clear paths of egress;
Assure that the facility does not exceed its occupant load limit;
Initiate a fire alarm if necessary and direct occupants to exits;
Assure that audible announcements are made before each
program or performance notifying occupants of emergency exit
locations;
Complete the Fire and Building Safety Checklist daily, before
the facility opens; [and]
Keep completed checklists on file and available to fire and
building code officials for at least one year.

The sources of the Station nightclub fire, the polyurethane foam used
to line the walls and ceiling of the club and the pyrotechnics set off during
the show, were not permitted by either the NFPA, ICC, or the Rhode Island
state fire codes at the time of the fire.137 The foam hung on the walls and
ceiling for two years throughout at least two fire code inspections, but it was
never cited as a violation.138 The devastation caused by the lack of code
enforcement highlights the importance of sustainable enforcement strategies
to ensure that code provisions are actually enforced.
As the potential for violence within event venues and security
procedural concerns become more apparent, it is helpful to examine how past
fire-related legislation can be used as a model for event venue security
legislation. The tragedy of the Station nightclub fire inspired legislation and
regulations regarding fire safety within event venues and saved countless
lives. Similar legislation and regulation regarding event venue security
standards could help to prevent future instances of violence within event
venues, help to save lives in violent situations, and give venue owners and

134. Id.
135. Johnson, supra note 132.
136. See Crowd Managers, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/service-details/crowdmanagers [https://perma.cc/LQ25-78PT].
137. Tidwell, supra note 111, at 31.
138. BARYLICK, supra note 112, at 103.
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promoters clear standards to follow to prevent tort liability due to violent
actions by third parties.
IV. PROPOSED MODEL VENUE SECURITY LEGISLATION
The actions of the Rhode Island and Massachusetts legislatures after
the Station nightclub fire showed that, even if there is already legislation in
place to lessen the dangers of injuries or casualties in event venues, such
legislation can be expanded upon or improved if shown to be inadequate to
prevent such dangers. After recent incidents of gun violence against fans and
artists,139 disorderly and injurious evacuations, and public panic over
perceived threats,140 such violent events will likely become more foreseeable,
even at small venues, and leave venue owners and promoters open to tort
liability.141 What follows is model legislation to address growing concerns
over violence in event venues, influenced by legislative responses to the
Station nightclub fire, existing venue safety state legislation, and model
venue safety codes.
Model Venue Safety Act
(A) Definitions:
(1) In this section, “live entertainment” means a live
musical or comedic performance by one or more performers
held indoors and open to the public, with the audience being
present primarily for the purpose of viewing
performances,142 with a capacity of 100 or greater.
(2) In this section, “outdoor music festival” means a
live musical or comedic performance by one or more
individuals or groups held out of doors and not in a
permanent structure, with the audience being present
primarily for the purpose of viewing performances, with a
capacity of 100 or greater.143

139. See Williams, supra note 10; see also Kreps, supra note 27.
140. See Mervosh, supra note 33; see also Kreps, supra note 27.
141. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 57, at 65 (noting that “the issues of venue and promoter
liability will likely become the focus of increased judicial scrutiny. As violent acts are
perpetrated, it will become more difficult for venues and promoters to disclaim liability by
maintaining that such senseless acts of violence are not foreseeable.”).
142. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 53-02-01 (West 2019); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2917.40 (West 2019).
143. See PURPLE GUIDE, supra note 97, at 6; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 28, § 925(1)
(West 2019).
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(B) The purpose of this section is to provide for the creation
of a Board of Live Entertainment and Outdoor Music Festival
Security (“The Board”). The powers necessary to implement the
provisions of this act shall be vested in the state Department of Safety
and Homeland Security. 144
(1) The Board shall consist of fourteen members
appointed by the governor for terms of six years each.145
(a) Members of the board shall include an
attorney, an insurance broker, a production
manager, a current or former state fire marshal, a
current or former employee of the International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, an
administrative-level private security company
employee, an employee of the National Weather
Service, and three chiefs of police: one from a
community with a population of less than twentyfive thousand, one from a community with a
population of more than twenty-five thousand but
less than fifty thousand, and one from a community
with a population over fifty thousand.
(b) The remaining four members of the
Board shall be appointed at the discretion of the
governor.146
(2) The Board shall, by one year from the date of the
statute’s enactment, prepare and approve regulations setting
forth goals and implementation measures for improving live
entertainment and outdoor music festival security standards
within the state.147 The comprehensive plan must include,
but is not limited to:
(a) Requirements for live entertainment and
outdoor music festival promoters to create an event
safety management plan. Outdoor music festival
144. The official or office responsible for implementation of this statute will vary from
state to state depending upon administrative structure. Cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22D § 4
(West 2019).
145. Cf. 22D § 4 (outlining how members of the Board of Fire Prevention shall be
appointed and how long they may serve on the Board).
146. This will allow for flexibility as security needs change and more areas where
expertise is needed become apparent.
147. Cf. 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-28.01-5(b) (West 2019) (setting a deadline for
enactment of a comprehensive fire safety plan).
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promoters shall submit such a plan to the local chief
of police at least two weeks prior to the event. Live
entertainment event venues shall submit such a plan
to the local chief of police annually by the second
Friday in January. Such plan shall include but not be
limited to: identification of potential security
hazards, evaluation of such risks and precautions the
promoter or venue owner will take to prevent them
from occurring, identification of key venue staff
members including those listed in sections (d)(i)(ii), a meeting spot for key staff members to meet in
case of a major incident, potential announcement
scripts for emergency messages, identification of
ambulance loading areas, and potential holding
areas for attendees;148
(b) Requirements regarding the number of
security personnel required at a live entertainment
venue or outdoor music festival based upon the
number of expected event attendees;
(c) Standard guidelines for bag checks and
pat-downs for live entertainment events and outdoor
music festivals; factors to be considered include, but
are not limited to, the number of expected attendees
and the number of entrances to the live
entertainment or outdoor music festival venue
which are open to event attendees;
(d) Requirements for event staff members
who must be designated and present at live
entertainment events and outdoor music festivals at
any time that the spaces are open to the public or
ticketholders. Required staff members shall include,
but are not limited to:
(i) A Security Manager who shall
oversee all security staff present at a live
entertainment event or outdoor music
festival, ensure that security staff perform
any required bag checks or pat-downs as
required by the Board, and make the
decision and communicate with the Crowd
148. See PURPLE GUIDE, supra note 97, at 2 (suggesting the need for a clear understanding
of allocation of safety-related job duties).
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Manager and performers if a performance
must end due to an emergency situation.149
(ii) A Crowd Manager who shall
maintain clear paths of egress, ensure that
each exit has clear signage in place to
identify it as such, ensure that the facility
does not exceed its occupancy limit, and
communicate with attendees if the
performance must end or if the live
entertainment venue or the outdoor music
festival must evacuate due to an emergency.
The Board shall create a Crowd Security
Manager certification program.150
(3) The Board shall hold public hearings on the first
Fridays in January and June of each year, and at such other
times as it may determine, regarding suggested changes in
its rules and regulations. If the Board wishes to make
changes to the regulations after such public hearings, it must
give notice in entertainment industry professional
publications at least ten days before a further hearing
adopting such changes.151
(4) The Board shall review and amend the plan as
necessary every five years. The plan may be reviewed and
amended periodically as needed.152
(C) This section does not apply to privately held, nonticketed events or church services.153
(D) A live entertainment or outdoor music festival venue
owner’s failure to comply with this Act may result in the revocation
of the venue’s liquor license and misdemeanor charges.154

149. Id.
150. See Crowd Managers, supra note 136.
151. Cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 148 § 10 (West 2018) (designating dates for public
hearings regarding proposed changes to fire safety regulations).
152. Cf. 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-28.01-5(b) (West 2018) (requiring the review and
possible amendment of Rhode Island’s comprehensive fire safety plan).
153. Specific exceptions may vary based upon common types of events in each state. Cf.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.40(G)(2) (West 2019) (similar language noting exceptions to
statute regarding seating and crowd control requirements).
154. Enforcement provisions are vital to ensure that potentially lifesaving provisions are
followed. See, e.g., Tidwell, supra note 111 (noting that, even though statutory law prohibited
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V. REASONING BEHIND THE MODEL VENUE SECURITY LEGISLATION
Updated fire code legislation in Rhode Island and Massachusetts
after the Station nightclub tragedy can serve as a model for how states may
adjust or enact legislation to deal with potential violence at live event and
outdoor music festival venues as such events become more foreseeable. Such
legislation can help to ensure that individuals with expertise in live events
and dealing with such threats have a say in new live event security
regulations.
A. Composition of the Board
Updated fire code legislation in Rhode Island and Massachusetts
after the Station nightclub tragedy and the model rules and membership
composition of the ESA and the Events Industry Forum demonstrate the
effectiveness of obtaining input from individuals with wide varieties of work
experience to serve as Board members and implement the provisions of the
Act. The Massachusetts legislature’s vesting of the power to enact fire
regulations in a Board of Fire Prevention ensures that individuals with strong
knowledge of fire safety are the designated individuals to make decisions on
the best fire safety practices because the Board’s members must consist of
“the state fire marshal . . . the commissioner of the Boston fire department
. . . and 14 members to be appointed by the governor, for terms of six years
each.”155 The fourteen appointed members are to include representatives who
are the heads of fire departments from various communities, a member of the
Massachusetts Fire Prevention Association, a fire protection engineer, a
chemical engineer, a mechanical engineer, an electrical engineer, a chemist
with fire testing experience, a representative of the public, a graduate chemist
with fire testing experience, an inspector of wires with an electrician’s
license, a blasting industry representative, a building inspector, and an
electrical contractor.156
Similarly, the Board of Directors, Advisory Council, and staff
members of the ESA, the publisher of the Event Safety Guide, consist of
members with diverse career and expertise backgrounds, including an
attorney,157 insurance broker,158 production manager,159 event planner and

the use of the polyurethane foam on the walls and ceiling of the Station nightclub, the venue
passed at least two fire code inspections with the foam in place).
155. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22D § 4 (West 2019).
156. Id.
157. Steve A. Adelman, EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/
stevenadelman [https://perma.cc/B3HC-A4DC].
158. Scott Carroll, EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/scottcarroll [https://perma.cc/5C8K-652H].
159. Charlie Hernandez Sr., EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/
charlie-hernandez-sr [https://perma.cc/Z3CJ-GCV9].
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project manager,160 a former state fire marshal,161 employees of the
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE), the National
Weather Service, and other live event industry professionals.162 The ESA
describes its advisory council members as having “diverse backgrounds,
experiences, and points of view,” but a shared, united focus “to help the
Event Safety Alliance better serve the needs of everyone working in or
attending live events” while “setting the strategic vision for the organization,
guiding . . . development of critical projects, and helping procure human and
financial resources.”163 Such diverse backgrounds give the ESA team a broad
range of expertise to consult when setting policies and editing the Event
Safety Guide.
Although the Event Safety Guide does not yet focus on specific
suggestions for security screenings, the organizational structure provides
another model164 for how individuals from varied backgrounds can use their
expertise to address potential safety protocols from multiple perspectives and
keep such protocols current as new safety threats become foreseeable.
Similarly, the Events Industry Forum also consists of members involved in
various aspects of the event industry in the United Kingdom who contribute
to the model standards and policies expressed in the Purple Guide.165
Like the Massachusetts Board of Fire Prevention and the ESA,
section (B)(1) of the Model Venue Safety Act calls for individuals with
diverse work experience and expertise within live event production, security,
and other surrounding industries to form the Board of Live Entertainment
and Outdoor Music Festival Security to address and anticipate safety issues
from a broad variety of perspectives.
B. Public Hearings, Review, and Amendment
Section (B)(3) of the Model Venue Safety Act requires bi-annual
public hearings for suggested changes to and comments regarding the
Board’s regulations. Section (B)(4) requires the Board to review and, if
needed, amend the regulations every five years. After the tragic Station
nightclub fire, state legislatures reacted by updating their fire safety
legislation to address shortcomings in prior legislation and included
provisions to require regular review and updates to legislation and
regulations. The Rhode Island Comprehensive Fire Safety Act must be

160. Steve Lemon, EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/stevelemon [https://perma.cc/9MA6-X7WE].
161. Donald C. Cooper, EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/
donald-cooper [https://perma.cc/2NVE-H4S8].
162. Our Leadership, EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/ourleadership/ [https://perma.cc/F2YT-VTHE].
163. Id.
164. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 148 § 10 (West 2018).
165. PURPLE GUIDE, supra note 94; EVENTS INDUSTRY F., supra note 95.
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reviewed and updated every five years166 and the Massachusetts Board of
Fire Prevention is required to hold bi-annual public hearings regarding
petitions for changes in its regulations.167 Similarly, event professionals
frequently reflect upon more expansive or effective security measures after a
violent incident at a venue or festival.168 While the Model Venue Safety Act
gives the Board the authority to review and amend its regulations at any time
as needed, the required reviews every five years help to ensure that the
regulations are proactive and not merely reactionary. Like the Event Safety
Guide, which the ESA stated was intended to be a “living document” to be
updated as “new approaches and technologies emerge” in event safety,169 the
Board’s regulations should regularly evolve to address new security
measures and potential dangers.
C. Capacity
The Model Venue Safety Act applies to all venues and outdoor music
festivals open to the public with capacities of 100 or greater; it does not call
for any grandfather exemptions for pre-existing venues. Requirements for
venues to have high capacities before statutory regulation of security lessen
the effectiveness of such legislative efforts. Recent violent incidents at live
events demonstrate that even small-scale events are not immune from
tragedy. The Alrosa Villa Nightclub, where a concertgoer shot and killed
“Dimebag” Darrell Abbott onstage, had a capacity of 600; there were only
250 individuals in attendance at the time of the shooting.170 The Plaza Live,
where a concert attendee shot and killed musician Christina Grimmie during
a meet and greet, has a general admission standing room capacity of 1,250,
but the reserved seating capacity is 903; there were only 300 individuals in
the crowd the night of Ms. Grimmie’s shooting.171
Both venues accommodated capacities below the numbers set by
many state statutes to require security personnel onsite or crowd control

166. 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-28.01-5(b) (West 2019).
167. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 148 § 10 (West 2018).
168. For example, the aerial attack during the Route 91 Harvest Festival caused event
and security industry professionals to consider more expansive avenues of outdoor music
festival security. See, e.g., Dave Brooks, Las Vegas Shooting: Security Experts Explore New
Safety Solutions, BILLBOARD (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/
magazine-feature/7989203/las-vegas-shooting-security-experts-new-safety-precautions
[https://perma.cc/43P2-FJLN] (discussing how event professionals need “out-of-the-box
ideas” to prevent situations like the aerial assault from happening again, including the use of
hydraulically raised observation towers with SWAT team sharpshooters or “safety zone”
barriers for attendees to hide behind in case of attacks).
169. EVENT SAFETY ALL., supra note 76, at 3.
170. Wilkinson, supra note 16.
171. Ryan, supra note 9; Venue, THE PLAZA LIVE, https://www.plazaliveorlando.org/
venue-info [https://perma.cc/8LGV-K8VM].
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plans.172 In addition, statutory security requirements frequently leave the
amount of security personnel needed at an event, or the decision of whether
a concert promoter has an adequate security plan in place, to the discretion
of authorized local officials without any statutory definition or description of
what measures constitute adequate security.173 Florida, the state where Ms.
Grimmie’s murder occurred, does not even have a statute in place requiring
security guards at live events of any size.174
Such statutory omissions are comparable to Rhode Island’s building
code before the Station nightclub fire that required sprinklers in “places of
public assembly occupied by more than three hundred people,” yet contained
a grandfather clause allowing for the exemption of buildings constructed
before the legislation became effective, so that there was no sprinkler system
in the Station nightclub when fire consumed the building.175 The grandfather
exemptions were repealed after the tragedy.176 Similarly, a year after the
Station nightclub tragedy, the Massachusetts legislature passed a bill
requiring sprinklers in every “building or structure . . . of public assembly,
with a capacity of 100 persons or more, that is designed or used for
occupancy as a nightclub, dance hall, discotheque, bar, or for similar
entertainment purposes . . . .”177 Recent violent incidents at venues and
outdoor music festivals of varying sizes demonstrate the need for safety
legislation and regulations that apply to venues of varying sizes, but current
state security legislation tends to focus on only large capacity venues. The
Model Venue Safety Act aims to shift this focus to include smaller and midsize venues.
D. Designation of Roles
Section (B)(2)(d) of the Model Venue Safety Act requires the
designation of a Security Manager and a Crowd Manager to be present at live
entertainment events and outdoor music festivals. The Purple Guide notes
the importance of a clear understanding of allocation of safety-related
duties.178 The Event Safety Guide also recommends designating an
172. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 53-02-01 (West 2019); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §
2104.001 (West 2019) (regulating only issuance of permits for outdoor music festivals with
more than 5,000 attendees); see also N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 475(1)–(2) (McKinney 2019)
(requiring crowd control plans for “places of public assembly,” which are deemed to be
locations which can hold at least 5,000 attendees); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2917.40(B)–(D)
(West 2019).
173. See, e.g., § 53-02-08.
174. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 493.6301 (West 2019).
175. BARYLICK, supra note 112, at 103.
176. 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-28.1-7 (West 2018).
177. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 148 § 26G1/2 (West 2004); see also Deadliest U.S.
Nightclub Fire Influences Safety Codes, Burn Care, CBS NEWS (Nov. 28, 2017, 10:43 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cocoanut-grove-boston-nightclub-fire-safety-codes-burncare/ [https://perma.cc/8MUK-GZYG].
178. PURPLE GUIDE, supra note 97, at 2.
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individual, with no “other competing roles,” to coordinate safety-related
matters, such as “monitoring and coordinating safety performance,” and
“coordinating safety in response to a major incident.”179 The Security
Manager required by the Model Venue Safety Act would take on such a role.
Both The Event Safety Guide and the Purple Guide discuss the
importance of effective communication with attendees and the need for
designated individuals to communicate with the audience in case of an
emergency.180 A perceived threat of violence can cause panic in event
attendees and prompt actions that cause even more injuries than the actual
threat itself.181 Therefore, there is a need for a designated individual tasked
with communicating with the crowd in the case of an emergency or perceived
emergency. For example, the Massachusetts statute calls for a trained crowd
manager182 to perform duties including assuring that “audible
announcements are made before each program or performance notifying
occupants of emergency exit locations” and maintaining “clear paths of
egress.”183 Although the Massachusetts crowd manager requirement is
mainly in place for fire safety purposes, the crowd manager role could also
be used to ensure communication and more orderly evacuation in case of
violence or a threat of violence at a live event or music festival venue. While
the Security Manager’s role would be primarily to monitor safety
performance, the requirement of a separate Crowd Manager would help to
ensure effective communication and lessen safety issues caused by crowd
panic. In addition, while Section (D) of the Act contains an enforcement
provision calling for sanctions if a live entertainment or outdoor music
festival venue owner fails to comply with the requirements of the Act, both
the Security Manager and Crowd Safety Manager could also help to ensure
enforcement by monitoring safety performance at the venue.
CONCLUSION
As the number of yearly concert attendees expands and violent
incidents in venues become more reasonably foreseeable to venue owners
and concert promoters, state legislatures should take action to prevent future
injuries or deaths at live events and give venue owners and concert promoters
a clearer understanding of how to keep from breaching their duties to concert
attendees. The actions of the Rhode Island and Massachusetts state
legislatures after the tragic Station nightclub fire demonstrate how states can
also facilitate the creation of standard venue security guidelines to prevent or
alleviate the effects of future violent incidents in concert venues. Like the
model fire code of the NFPA and the ICC, The Event Safety Guide and The
179. EVENT SAFETY ALL., supra note 76, at 21.
180. Id. at 76–83; PURPLE GUIDE, supra note 102.
181. See, e.g., Mervosh, supra note 33; see also Southall & Winston, supra note 33.
182. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 148 § 10 (West 2004).
183. See Crowd Managers, supra note 136.
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Purple Guide serve as useful models to supplement existing state statutes
regarding venue security. Such existing statutes provide a good foundation
to improve venue security guidelines. However, they do not contain
sufficient standards to address recent concerns regarding violent incidents in
venues.
Legislative action to create a Board of Live Entertainment and
Outdoor Music Festival Security would allow for professionals with
expertise in event production, security, law, and other fields to combine their
knowledge and insight and create more up-to-date guidelines regarding
venue security. Such legislation would help to prevent unnecessary deaths
and injuries and avert future litigation against venue owners and promoters.
The Board’s ability to update security regulations would enable venue
owners and promoters to properly protect attendees as threats evolve.
Although every potential security threat cannot be anticipated, and security
regulations will not stop every attempted violent act from taking place,
legislation to regulate venue security guidelines would still likely prevent
more violent incidents from occurring by giving venue owners and promoters
a greater understanding of how to mitigate, and possibly prevent, such
emergency situations. Although nothing can be done to fix prior security
breaches and alleviate the pain caused by previous violent incidents, updated
venue security legislation can help protect event attendees in the future and
ensure that they return home safely.

